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Chinese Nationalist involvement might be counterproductive. The embassy thought that while the introduction of Chinese Nationalist troops in South Vietnam probably would cause no change in Chinese Communist strategy, the rest of the world might view the act as a prelude to another war. In addition, the traditional anti-Chinese attitude of the Vietnamese had to be taken into account because it could have a strong bearing on the acceptability of Chinese Nationalist troops to the government of South Vietnam. Weighing both the military and political aspects of the question, General Westmoreland recommended that Republic of China troops be deployed only when the political questions had been resolved.

During 1967 the team of Chinese advisers on electric power was increased to thirty-four and a sixteen-man surgical team was introduced into Vietnam to assist in expanding public health programs. In mid-June 1967, having already obtained Vietnam government approval, the Republic of China military attache in Saigon wrote General Westmoreland for permission to end four groups of officers to South Vietnam for one month's on-the-job training. The groups would consist of from eight to ten officers each in the branches of intelligence, artillery, armor, ordnance, and engineering and would be assigned to a compatible U.S. unit. General Westmoreland, with concurrence from the U.S. Embassy, opposed the project for several reasons. First, the military working agreement signed by General Westmoreland and the commanding general of the Republic of China Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam, provided only for essentially political and psychological warfare advisory personnel and prohibited their engagement in combat missions. Second, this new proposal would expose Chinese officers to combat, with the risk of their death or capture, and provide a ready-made situation for Chinese Communist charges of Nationalist Chinese military intervention. Of lesser importance was the fact that the officers' association with U.S. units would disclose their presence to news correspondents. Approval of such a request would also establish a precedent likely to encourage additional Chinese requests for a long-term commitment of more contingents, and might also tempt others to follow Nationalist China's example. The proposal clearly posed serious political risk and military burden to the United States without any tangible benefits.

The State Department agreed with General Westmoreland's appraisal and hoped that the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Republic of China, and the U.S. Embassy at Taipei would let the matter drop before the State Department had to