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medical men and to help with the problem of refugees. Three LST crews were also to assist in the waterborne logistical effort. The LST's belonged to the U.S. Navy port, Keelung, on Taiwan.

Two political warfare advisers were stationed in each of the four corps tactical zones, three advisers at the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Political Warfare College in Dalat, and the other three with the Armed Forces General Political Warfare Directorate in Saigon. Sponsors and supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the seven-member provincial health assistance team worked in the provincial hospital at Phan Thiet. The Republic of China also provided C-46 aircraft and crews for refugee relief missions in South Vietnam. By the end of 1965 assistance from the Republic of China had been increased to include eighty-six agricultural experts and a nine-man mission to supervise construction and operation of the 33,000-kilowatt power plant located at Thu Duc.

Additional aid was sought from the republic early in 1966 when the United States requested six LST's for service in South Vietnam. Originally given to the Nationalists under the U.S. Military Assistance Program, the ships were to be manned by Chinese crews in civilian clothing and fly U.S. flags. The United States would bear the cost of crew wages and ship maintenance. The mission of the ships was to fill the need for shallow-draft coastal vessels and help ease harbor congestion. The Republic of China was able to provide only two ships; their transfer took place in April in a low key atmosphere without publicity.

In June General Westmoreland was asked to comment on the possibility of having Chinese Nationalist troops in South Vietnam. Since other Free World forces had been introduced, the prospect would possibly now be viewed in a different light. From a purely military point of view, General Westmoreland believed the use of Chinese Nationalist troops would be highly desirable. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, would welcome the addition of a well-trained, motivated, and disciplined marine brigade as early as it could be deployed; but from a political point of view, there were still many reservations concerning the introduction of Chinese Nationalist troops into the Vietnamese War. The U.S. Embassy at Saigon declined to make any specific comments or recommendations without first consulting the government of South Vietnam; however, the classification given to the subject made consultation impossible. It was the U.S. Embassy's belief that while some key figures in the government of South Vietnam would see the advantages of using troops from the Republic of China there was sufficient cause to believe that a