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[suggest]ed that Australia also take on the training mission for Vietnamese Regional Forces. On this proposition the minister expressed some doubt, but speculated that if an infantry battalion were sent to South Vietnam, some trainers–perhaps 100–might be attached to it. The American Ambassador in Saigon, General Taylor, then broached the subject with the South Vietnamese Prime Minister, Dr. Phan Huy Quat.

Talks continued at various levels and on 29 April 1965 Admiral Sharp conferred with the Australian Ambassador at the request of Ambassador Taylor. In the course of the discussions it was learned that the Australian government planned to dispatch to Saigon within fourteen days a small military planning staff to work out the logistic and administrative arrangements with U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, prior to the arrival of the Australian battalion. The battalion force would consist of 900 men, of which 100 were to be logistic and administrative troops; no integral support elements were planned for it. Moving both by sea and air, the unit was to reach South Vietnam by the first week of June. The Australian government agreed that the battalion should be under the operational control of General Westmoreland and that it should be used for the defense of base areas, for patrolling in the vicinity of base areas, and as a mobile reserve. However, the battalion was not to accept territorial responsibility for populated areas or to be involved in pacification operations.

By May when the plans were finalized they differed little from the earlier proposals. The Australian government was to send a task force composed of a headquarters element of the Australian Army, Far East, the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, reinforced, the 79th Signal Troop, and a logistical support company. Also included in this total of approximately 1,400 troops were 100 additional jungle warfare advisers to be used in support of the original training detachments. The task force arrived in Vietnam during the early part of June 1965 and was attached to the U.S. 173d Airborne Brigade.

Operating from Bien Hoa, the 1st Battalion was limited to local security operations during the remainder of the year. This restriction was a result of the Australian government's insistence that Australian forces not be used in offensive or reaction operations except in conjunction with the defense of Bien Hoa air base. Although the interpretation of the restriction was fairly broad in that the battalion could participate in operations within approximately 30 to 35 kilometers of the base, General Westmoreland was not able to plan for its wider use. For example, on