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 Defendants next argue Plaintiffs’ theories depend on “unfettered choices made by independent actors not before the courts and whose exercise of broad and legitimate discretion the courts cannot presume either to control or to predict.” ECF No. 28 at 20 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562). “[A] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 134 (2014); see also ''Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org.'', 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976) (“In other words, the ‘case or controversy’ limitation of Art. III still requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the independent action of some third party not before the court.”).

In this case, a favorable decision would likely relieve Plaintiffs of at least some of the injuries allegedly caused by FDA. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n.15 (1982) (“[Plaintiffs] need not show that a favorable decision will relieve [their] every injury.”); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env’t Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74–75 (1978) (a “substantial likelihood” of the requested relief redressing the alleged injury is enough); Sanchez v. R.G.L., 761 F.3d 495, 506 (5th Cir. 2014) (a plaintiff “need only show that a favorable ruling could potentially lessen its injury”); Texas v. Becerra, 577 F. Supp. 3d 527, 560 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (“That the plaintiffs have brought forth specific evidence and examples of how they will be harmed … distinguishes this case from others where a third party’s actions might have hurt the plaintiff.”). And redressability is satisfied even if relief must filter downstream through third parties uncertain to comply with the result, provided the relief would either: (1) remove an obstacle for a nonparty to act in a way favorable to the plaintiff; or (2) influence a nonparty to act in such a way. See, e.g., ''Dep’t of Com. v. New York'', 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2565–66 (2019) (“[T]hird parties will likely react in