Page:Allen v. Milligan.pdf/99

Rh the claim is that §2 requires the creation of an additional majority-minority district, the first precondition means that the plaintiff must produce an additional illustrative majority-minority district that is “reasonably configured.” Cooper, 581 U. S., at 301; Wisconsin Legislature, 595 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3); see also Gingles, 478 U. S., at 50.

The Court’s basic error is that it misunderstands what it means for a district to be “reasonably configured.” Our cases make it clear that “reasonably configured” is not a synonym for “compact.” We have explained that the first precondition also takes into account other traditional districting criteria like attempting to avoid the splitting of political subdivisions and “communities of interest.” League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399, 433–434 (2006) (LULAC).

To its credit, the Court recognizes that compactness is not enough and that a district is not reasonably configured if it flouts other “traditional districting criteria.” At various points in its opinion it names quite a few: minimizing the splitting of counties and other political subdivisions, keeping “communities of interest” together where possible, and avoiding the creation of new districts that require two incumbents to run against each other. , . In addition, the Court acknowledges that a district is not “reasonably configured” if it does not comport with the Equal Protection Clause’s one-person, one-vote requirement. But the Court fails to explain why compliance with “traditional districting criteria” matters under §2 or why the only relevant equal protection principle is the one-person, one-vote requirement. If the Court had attempted to answer these questions, the defect in its understanding of the first Gingles precondition would be unmistakable.

To explain this, I begin with what is probably the most frequently mentioned traditional districting criterion and ask why it should matter under §2 whether a proposed