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38 must ensure that its districting plan includes that number of majority-minority districts “or something quite close.” 582 F. Supp. 3d, at 1033. Thus construed and applied, §2 is not congruent and proportional to any provisions of the Reconstruction Amendments.

To determine the congruence and proportionality of a measure, we must begin by “identify[ing] with some precision the scope of the constitutional right at issue.” Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 365 (2001). The Reconstruction Amendments “forbi[d], so far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination … against any citizen because of his race,” ensuring that “[a]ll citizens are equal before the law.” Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 565, 591 (1896) (Harlan, J.). They dictate “that the Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.” Miller, 515 U. S., at 911 (internal quotation marks omitted). These principles are why the Constitution presumptively forbids race-predominant districting, “even for remedial purposes.” Shaw I, 509 U. S., at 657.

These same principles foreclose a construction of the Amendments that would entitle members of racial minorities, qua racial minorities, to have their preferred candidates win elections. Nor do the Amendments limit the rights of members of a racial majority to support their preferred candidates—regardless of whether minorities prefer different candidates and of whether “the majority, by virtue of its numerical superiority,” regularly prevails. Gingles, 478 U. S., at 48. Nor, finally, do the Amendments establish a norm of proportional control of elected offices on the basis of race. See Parents Involved, 551 U. S., at 730–731 (plurality opinion); Shaw I, 509 U. S., at 657. And these notions