Page:Allen v. Milligan.pdf/79

34, moreover, is consistent with how the majority describes the role of plaintiffs’ illustrative maps, as well as an unjustified practical asymmetry to which its rejection of computer evidence gives rise. Courts are to “focu[s] … on the specific illustrative maps that a plaintiff adduces,”, by which the majority means that courts should not “focu[s]” on statistical evidence showing those maps to be outliers. Thus, plaintiffs may use an algorithm to generate any number of maps that meet specified districting criteria and a preferred racial target; then, they need only produce one of those maps to “sho[w] it is possible that the State’s map” is dilutive. (emphasis in original). But the State may not use algorithmic evidence to suggest that the plaintiffs’ map is an unsuitable benchmark for comparison—not even, apparently, if it can prove that the illustrative map is an outlier among “billion[s]” or “trillion[s]” of concededly “adequate comparators.”, ; see also ante, at 29 (rejecting sampling algorithms). This arbitrary restriction amounts to a thumb on the scale for §2 plaintiffs—an unearned presumption that any “reasonable” map they put forward constitutes a benchmark against which the State’s map can be deemed dilutive. And, once the comparison is framed in that way, the only workable rule of decision is proportionality. See Holder, 512 U. S., at 941–943 (opinion of ).

By affirming the District Court, the majority thus approves its benchmark of proportional control limited only by feasibility, and it entrenches the most perverse tendencies