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32 ” to the question of how well any given algorithm approximates the correct benchmark. (internal quotation marks omitted). In the end, it concludes, “Section 2 cannot require courts to judge a contest of computers” in which “there is no reliable way to determine who wins, or even where the finish line is.”

The majority fails to recognize that whether vote-dilution claims require an undiluted benchmark is not up for debate. If §2 applies to single-member districting plans, courts cannot dispense with an undiluted benchmark for comparison, ascertained by an objective and workable method. Bossier Parish School Bd., 520 U. S., at 480; Holder, 512 U. S., at 881 (plurality opinion). Of course, I would be the last person to deny that defining the undiluted benchmark is difficult. See id., at 892 (opinion of ) (arguing that it “immerse[s] the federal courts in a hopeless project of weighing questions of political theory”). But the “myriad considerations” and “[a]nswerless questions” the majority frets about,, , are inherent in the very enterprise of applying §2 to single-member districts. Everything the majority says about the difficulty of defining the undiluted benchmark with computer evidence applies with equal or greater force to the task of defining it without such evidence. At their core, the majority’s workability concerns are an isolated demand for rigor against the backdrop of a legal regime that has long been “ ‘inherently standardless,’ ” and must remain so until the Court either discovers a principled and objective method of identifying the undiluted benchmark, Holder, 512 U. S., at 885 (plurality opinion), or abandons this enterprise altogether, see id., at 945 (opinion of ).

Ultimately, the majority has very little to say about the appropriate benchmark. What little it does say suggests that the majority sees no real alternative to the District Court’s proportional-control benchmark, though it appears unwilling to say so outright. For example, in a nod to the