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8 §2.” Holder, 512 U. S., at 881 (plurality opinion).

Given the diverse circumstances of different jurisdictions, it would be fanciful to expect a one-size-fits-all definition of the appropriate benchmark. Cf. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 79 (1986) (explaining that the vote-dilution inquiry “is peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case and requires an intensely local appraisal” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). One overriding principle, however, should be obvious. A proper districting benchmark must be race neutral: It must not assume, a priori, that an acceptable plan should include any particular number or proportion of minority-controlled districts.

I begin with §2’s text. As relevant here, §2(a) prohibits a State from “impos[ing] or appl[ying]” any electoral rule “in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right … to vote on account of race or color.” §10301(a). Section 2(b) then provides that §2(a) is violated "“if, based on the totality of circumstances, … the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State … are not equally open to participation by members of [a protected class] in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State … is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.” §10301(b)."

As we held two Terms ago in Brnovich, the “equal openness” requirement is “the core” and “touchstone” of §2(b),