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2 U. S., at 907 (opinion of ). The question presented is whether §2 of the Act, as amended, requires the State of Alabama to intentionally redraw its longstanding congressional districts so that black voters can control a number of seats roughly proportional to the black share of the State’s population. Section 2 demands no such thing, and, if it did, the Constitution would not permit it.

At the outset, I would resolve these cases in a way that would not require the Federal Judiciary to decide the correct racial apportionment of Alabama’s congressional seats. Under the statutory text, a §2 challenge must target a “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure.” 52 U. S. C. §10301(a). I have long been convinced that those words reach only “enactments that regulate citizens’ access to the ballot or the processes for counting a ballot”; they “do not include a State’s … choice of one districting scheme over another.” Holder, 512 U. S., at 945 (opinion of ). “Thus, §2 cannot provide a basis for invalidating any district.” Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (, concurring) (slip op., at 1).

While I will not repeat all the arguments that led me to this conclusion nearly three decades ago, see Holder, 512 U. S., at 914–930 (opinion concurring in judgment), the Court’s belated appeal to the statutory text is not persuasive. See. Whatever words like “practice” and “procedure” are capable of meaning in a vacuum, the prohibitions of §2 apply to practices and procedures that affect “voting” and “the right … to vote.” §10301(a). “Vote” and “voting” are defined terms under the Act, and the Act’s definition plainly focuses on ballot access and counting:

“The terms ‘vote’ or ‘voting’ shall include all action necessary to make a vote effective in any primary, special, or general election, including, but not limited to,