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Rh If Gingles demanded a proportional number of majority-minority districts, States would be forced to group together geographically dispersed minority voters into unusually shaped districts, without concern for traditional districting criteria such as county, city, and town lines. But Gingles and this Court’s later decisions have flatly rejected that approach. See, e.g., Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2018) (slip op., at 33–34); Bush v. Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 979 (1996) (plurality opinion); Gingles, 478 U. S., at 50; see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 917–920 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 644–649 (1993);.

Third, Alabama argues that courts should rely on race-blind computer simulations of redistricting maps to assess whether a State’s plan abridges the right to vote on account of race. It is true that computer simulations might help detect the presence or absence of intentional discrimination. For example, if all of the computer simulations generated only one majority-minority district, it might be difficult to say that a State had intentionally discriminated on the basis of race by failing to draw a second majority-minority district.

But as this Court has long recognized—and as all Members of this Court today agree—the text of §2 establishes an effects test, not an intent test. See ; (, dissenting);  (, dissenting). And the effects test, as applied by Gingles to redistricting, requires in certain circumstances that courts account for the race of voters so as to prevent the cracking or packing—whether intentional or not—of large