Page:Allen v. Milligan.pdf/105

Rh first Gingles precondition. The court thought that a §2 plaintiff cannot proffer a reasonably configured majority-minority district without first attempting to see if it is possible to create such a district—that is, by first making the identification of such a district “non-negotiable.” Ibid. But that is simply not so. A plaintiff’s expert can first create maps using only criteria that do not give race a predominant role and then determine how many contain the desired number of majority-minority districts.

One final observation about the District Court’s opinion is in order. The opinion gives substantial weight to the disparity between the percentage of majority-black House districts in the legislature’s plan (14%) and the percentage of black voting-age Alabamians (27%), while the percentage in the plaintiffs’ plan (29%) came closer to that 27% mark. See, e.g., id., at 946, 1016, 1018, 1025–1026; see also id., at 958–959, 969, 976, 982, 991–992, 996–997. Section 2 of the VRA, however, states expressly that no group has a right to representation “in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.” 52 U. S. C. §10301(b). This provision was a critical component of the compromise that led to the adoption of the 1982 amendments, as the Court unanimously agreed two Terms ago. See Brnovich, 594 U. S., at ___, and n. 14 (slip op., at 22, and n. 14); id., at ___, n. 6 (, dissenting) (slip op., at 19, n. 6). The District Court’s reasoning contravened this statutory proviso. See ante, at 11–12, 28–30 (, dissenting).

The Court spends much of its opinion attacking what it takes to be the argument that Alabama has advanced in this litigation. I will not debate whether the Court’s characterization of that argument is entirely correct, but as applied to the analysis I have just set out, the Court’s criticisms miss the mark.