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RV 196 (Chap. 1.) Certainly.

Do we call each of these beautiful then in its Kind, on the same Account, or on some Account, peculiar to itself? You will judge of it, by this: since we see a Dog naturally formed for one thing, a Horse for another, and a Nightingale, for Instance, for another; in general, it will not be absurd to pronounce each of them beautiful, so far as it is in the Condition most suitable to its own Nature: but, since the Nature of each is different, I think each of them must be beautiful, in a different Way. Is it not so?

Agreed.

Then, what makes a Dog beautiful, makes a Horse deformed; and what makes a horse beautiful, a Dog deformed; if their Natures are different.

So it seems probable.

For, I suppose, what makes a good Pancratiast makes no good Wrestler, and a very ridiculous Racer; and the very same Person who appears beautiful as a Pentathlete, would appear very deformed, in Wrestling.

Very true.

What then, makes a Man beautiful? Is it the same, in general, that makes a Dog or a Horse so?

The same.

What is it then, that makes a Dog beautiful?

That Excellency which belongs to a Dog.

What, a Horse?

The Excellency of a Horse. What,