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RV 96 (Chap. 1.) The Appearance of a Paradox to many, in the present Case, seems to me to arise from something like this: If, indeed, we assert, that Courage and Caution are to be used, in the same Instances, we should justly be accused of uniting Contradictions: but, in the Way that we affirm it, where is the Absurdity? For, if what hath been so often said, and so often demonstrated, be certain, that the Essence of Good and Evil consists in the Use of the Appearances; and that Things independent on Choice, are not of the Nature either of Good or Evil; what Paradox do the Philosophers assert, if they say: "Where Things are not dependent on Choice, be courageous: where they are, be cautious?" For in these only, if Evil consists in a bad Choice, is Caution to be used. And if Things independent on Choice, and not in our Power, are nothing to us, in these we are to make use of Courage. Thus we shall be at once cautious and courageous: and, indeed, courageous on the Account of this very Caution; for by using Caution with regard to things really evil, we shall gain Courage, with regard to what are not so.

§. 2. But we are in the same Condition as [hunted] Deer: when these, in a Fright, fly from the Feathers, where do they turn, and to what do they retire for Safety? To the Toils And thus they are undone, by inverting the Objects of Fear and Confidence. Thus we, too, In what Instances do we make use of Fear? In Things independent on Choice. In what, on the other hand, do we behave with Courage, as if there were nothing to be dreaded? In Things dependent on Choice. To be deceived then, or to act rashly or impudently, or to indulge an ignominious Desire, is of no Importance