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and nothing in the Compact suggests the parties under­stood there were “certain purposes for which the expressly conferred power. . . could not be employed.” Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F. 2d 1145, 1153 (CADC 1984) (opinion for the court by Scalia, J.). Moreover, Article 3 ensures that no such restrictions may be implied, since it provides that the Compact shall not be “construed to infringe upon, limit or abridge” the sovereign rights of a party State.

A comparison of the Compact with other, contemporane­ously enacted, compacts confirms there is no such limita­tion on North Carolina’s right to withdraw. See Texas v. New Mexico, supra, at 565. In contrast to the Compact, several other compacts concerning the creation of regional facilities for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste contain express good-faith limitations upon a State’s exercise of its rights. See, e.g., Central Compact, Art. III(f), 99 Stat. 1865; Central Midwest Compact, Art. V(a), id., at 1886; Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management Compact, Art. V(a), id., at 1897.

North Carolina submits two exceptions—one to the Special Master’s Second Report and one to his Preliminary Report.

North Carolina takes exception to the recommendation of the Second Report to deny without prejudice its motion for summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiffs’ equita­ble claims in Counts III–V. North Carolina’s motion was based on the ground that, as a matter of law, its obligations are governed entirely by the Compact. The Special Master recommended denying the motion without preju­dice, because the claims in Counts III–V “requir[e] further briefing and argument, and possibly further discovery.”