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642   we overrule Chatelain v. Kelley, 322 Ark. 517, 910 S.W.2d 215 (1995).

B. Retroactive or prospective application
[6] The next question that arises is whether our decision to overrule Chatelain should be applied retroactively or prospectively. As we stated recently in Bean v. Office of Child Support Enfcm't, 340 Ark. 286, 9 S.W.3d 520 (2000), our rule on this point could not be more clear; retroactivity is a matter of legislative intent. Generally, we observe a strict rule of statutory construction against retroactive operation and presume that the legislature intends for statutes and amendments to be applied prospectively. However, this rule does not ordinarily apply to procedural or remedial legislation. Bean, 340 Ark. at 297, 9 S.W.3d at 526 (citing Gannett Rover States Publ'g Co. v. Arkansas Industrial Dev. Comm'n, 303 Ark. 684, 799 S.W.2d 543 (1990); Forrest City Mach. Works v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33, 616 S.W.2d 720 (1981)). The majority of jurisdictions maintain that wrongful-death statutes are remedial in nature and should, therefore, be interpreted liberally to accomplish the "purposes of compensating injured persons and deterring harmful conduct." See Chatelain, 322 Ark. at 519, 910 S.W.2d at 216 (citing Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982)).

[7, 8] We have observed the cardinal principle for construing remedial legislation by giving appropriate regard to the spirit that promoted a statute's enactment, the mischief sought to be abolished, and the remedy proposed. Bean, 340 Ark. at 297, 9 S.W.3d at 526 (internal citations omitted). Finally, we have held that retroactive application is appropriate for remedial statutes that "do not disturb vested rights, or create new obligations, but only supply a new or more appropriate remedy to enforce an existing right orobligation." Id.; see also Harrison v. Matthews, 235 Ark. 915, 362 S.W.2d 704 (1962).

[9] When this court overrules a prior decision and states the rule to be followed in the future, we also acknowledge the need to rely upon the validity of actions taken in faith upon the old decision. See Wiles v. Wiles, 289 Ark. 340, 711 S.W.2d 789 (1986); Crisco v. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 Ark. 127, 258 S.W.2d 551 (1953). However, given that the overruling of a decision relates back to the date of the overruled decision, we have also observed that no matter how a new rule of law is applied, the benefit of the new decision is denied to some injured persons. See Taliafero v. Barnett, 47 Ark. 359, 1 S.W. 702 (1886); Parish, 244 Ark. at 1254, 429 S.W.2d at 53.