Page:Aircraft Accident Report for 1972 Sacramento Canadair Sabre accident.pdf/22

 2.2

(a)


 * 1) The aircraft was certificated in accordance with existing regulations.
 * 2) The pilot was certificated and held a valid letter of authority for the flight.
 * 3) The regulations and procedures concerning certification of experimental aircraft, and issuance of letters of authority for pilots, were inadequate.
 * 4) The aircraft was capable of taking off from Runway 30 without incident, under the conditions at Sacramento.
 * 5) The differences between the horizon and runway length at Oakland and Sacramento created visual illusions that induced an apparent need for rapid lift-off at Sacramento.
 * 6) The pilot did not have sufficient experience in the Sabre Mark 5 to enable him to compensate for the misleading visual cues.
 * 7) The catastrophic consequence of this accident is directly attributed to the proximity of the shopping center to the runway.

(b)

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the overrotation of the aircraft and subsequent derogation of the performance capability. The overrotation was the result of inadequate pilot proficiency in the aircraft and misleading visual cues.

3.

As a result of the investigation of this accident, the Safety Board on December 28, 1972, issued five recommendations (Nos. A-72-219 through 223) directed to the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. Copies of the recommendation letter and the Administrator's response thereto are included in Appendices E and F, respectively.