Page:Air and Liquid Systems Corp., et al. v. Roberta G. DeVries, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of John B. DeVries, Deceased, et al..pdf/21

Rh provide their own warnings?

Headscratchers like these are sure to enrich lawyers and entertain law students, but they also promise to leave everyone else wondering about their legal duties, rights, and liabilities.

Nor is this kind of uncertainty costless. Consider what might follow if the Court’s standard were widely adopted in tort law. Would a company that sells smartphone cases have to warn about the risk of exposure to cell phone radiation? Would a car maker have to warn about the risks of improperly stored antifreeze? Would a manufacturer of flashlights have to warn about the risks associated with leaking batteries? Would a seller of hot dog buns have to warn about the health risks of consuming processed meat? Just the threat of litigation and liability would force many manufacturers of safe products to spend time and money educating themselves and writing warnings about the dangers of other people’s more dangerous products. All this would, as well, threaten to leave consumers worse off. After all, when we effectively require manufacturers of safe products to subsidize those who make more dangerous items, we promise to raise the price and restrict the output of socially productive products. Tort law is supposed to be about aligning liability with responsibility, not mandating a social insurance policy in which everyone must pay for everyone else’s mistakes.

Finally and relatedly, the Court’s new standard implicates the same sort of fair notice problem that the court of appeals’ standard did. Decades ago, the bare metal defendants produced their lawful products and provided all the warnings the law required. Now, they are at risk of