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 the Commonwealth Bill a permanent disagreement could not occur. The provisions of the suffrage were such that the people could not disagree permanently with themselves; for it had previously been provided that both Houses are to be elected on the suffrage that prevails in each colony for the election of the representatives of the popular Chamber—that is, practically on the basis of manhood suffrage, (or universal suffrage in the colonies which have adopted it) with no property qualification for either electors or representatives; every State to have six representatives in the Senate or States House, and to be represented according to population in the House of Representatives. How then, it was asked, could the people of the Federation, voting as States for the Senate, disagree with the people of the Federation voting as different constituencies for the election of their representatives in the Lower House? However this might be, it was determined to insert some provisions for the prevention of what are known as "deadlocks" between the two Houses. Here again there was great difficulty, and danger of final disagreement. It was proposed that the question in dispute should be decided by the electors at a referendum. But this was strenuously opposed by the representatives of the smaller States, as tending simply to swamp them by force of numbers, and give all power to the two large States. This, it was said, was not federation, but amalgamation and absorption. Finally, the following elaborate provision was arrived at. In the case of Bills, other than appropriation or taxation Bills, which have been twice passed by the House of Representatives, and twice rejected or shelved by the Senate, the two Houses are to be simultaneously dissolved; and if, after the election, they should still disagree, the members of the two Houses will meet at a joint sitting, and the Bill will become law if three-fifths of the members present, and