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 schools than elsewhere” because of “the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.” ''Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton'', 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995). Schools operate in loco parentis to students and are “permit[ed] a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults.” Id. at 655. This is because, “in a public school environment[,] … the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety.” ''Bd. of Educ. v. Earls'', 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002).

Indeed, schools’ responsibilities are so great that they can be held liable for their failures to protect students from sexual assault and harassment. See, e.g., ''Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd. v. A.N.'', 905 So. 2d 203, 204–05 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (upholding a jury verdict that found a school to be negligent and thus liable for failure to protect a student from sexual assault by another student in the bathroom); see also ''Williams v. Bd. of Regents'', 477 F.3d 1282, 1288–91 (11th Cir. 2007) (reversing a district court’s dismissal of a Title IX claim against the University of Georgia alleging gang rape by a group of athletes in a university dormitory). Given schools’ responsibilities, the Supreme Court has afforded deference to their decisions even when examining certain constitutional issues. See, e.g., Acton, 515 U.S. at 665 (Fourth Amendment); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403–08 (2007) (First Amendment); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 (1977) (Eighth Amendment).

None of that, of course, is to say that schools have carte blanche. It is to say, though, that when school authorities have prudently assessed and addressed an issue that affects student