Page:Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida (2022).pdf/144

 Here again, Bostock’s reasoning, separate from any Title VII-specific language, demonstrates that “sex” was a but-for cause of the discrimination Adams experienced. Recall that in Bostock the Supreme Court reasoned that when an employer fired an employee for being transgender, the discrimination was due to at least two factors, the individual’s “sex” and “something else.” Id. at 1742. The same reasoning applies here: Adams was excluded from the boys’ bathroom under the policy either because he had one specific biological marker traditionally associated with females, genital anatomy (or, put differently, because he lacked that one specific biological marker traditionally associated with males). And so a but-for cause of Adams discriminatory exclusion from the boys’ restroom was “sex” within the meaning of Title IX. I would therefore affirm the district court’s judgment on Adam’s Title IX claim in addition to the equal protection claim.