Page:Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida (2022).pdf/123

 Courts consider four factors in determining whether a group constitutes a quasi-suspect class. First, we ask whether the group historically has been subjected to discrimination. See Lying v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986). Second, we look at whether the group has a defining characteristic that “frequently bears no relation to [the] ability to perform or contribute to society.” City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440–41 (citation omitted). Third, we consider whether the group has “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group.” Lying, 477 U.S. at 638. And fourth, we review whether the group is a minority lacking in political power. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987). Applying these factors here, I have no doubt that Adams, as a transgender individual, is a member of a quasi-suspect class.

The first factor—whether the class historically has been subject to discrimination—weighs heavily in favor of concluding that transgender individuals make up a quasi-suspect class. The district court found there was “a documented history of discrimination against transgender individuals.” Doc. 192 at 8 n.15. For instance, transgender people “are frequently harassed and discriminated against when seeking housing or applying to jobs or schools and are often victims of violent hate crimes.” Doc. 115-10 at 2. They