Page:Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida (2022).pdf/119

 corresponding to their gender identities. Unlike in Geduldig, no “benefits of the [policy] accrue to” transgender students. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20.

Because the bathroom policy facially discriminates against transgender students, I next ask what implications that classification carries for the Equal Protection Clause—namely, what level of scrutiny is appropriate given the bathroom policy’s classification of transgender versus cisgender students.
 * 2.The Bathroom Policy Contains a Sex-Based Classification, Triggering Heightened Scrutiny.

This case presents a cornucopia of different and sometimes overlapping theories for why the bathroom policy’s classification between transgender and cisgender students is a “sex-based classification.” Adams presents us with at least six theories. The School District and the majority opinion rely on a seventh.

Although the majority and I agree that heightened scrutiny applies to the bathroom policy, the majority opinion’s decision to