Page:Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida (2021).pdf/10

, 894 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). “[W]e are permitted to affirm the district court where the judgment entered is correct on any available legal ground.”, 53 F.3d 1228, 1230 (11th Cir. 1995).

Mr. Adams and the School Board both recognize that intermediate scrutiny applies to the School District’s bathroom policy, which categorizes on the basis of sex. We agree that heightened scrutiny applies, because Supreme Court and our circuit precedent require this level of scrutiny in cases involving sex discrimination.

The Fourteenth Amendment promises “the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. When state actors draw distinctions using sex or gender, this constitutional mandate “call[s] for a heightened standard of review.”, 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254 (1985). Because sex or gender “generally provide[] no sensible ground for differential treatment,”, the Equal Protection Clause tolerates only “exceedingly persuasive” classifications based on sex or gender, (“”), 518 U.S. 515, 534, 555, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2276, 2286 (1996) (quotation marks omitted). “A gender classification fails unless it is substantially related to a