Page:Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida (2020).pdf/70

 But courts regularly apply general standards of law to particular facts, and the Board asks this Court to apply the safe-harbor provision to the facts in this appeal. By declaring it not “necessary” to interpret the safe-harbor provision, the majority abandons statutory interpretation in favor of legislating a transgender exception to the safe-harbor provision. This approach offends basic principles of statutory interpretation. See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law § 8, at 93 (“The principle that a matter not covered is not covered is so obvious that it seems absurd to recite it. The judge should not presume that every statute answers every question … . Nor should the judge elaborate unprovided-for exceptions to a text … .”); EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (2015) (“We construe [a statute’s] silence as exactly that: silence.”).

Indeed, the majority turns Title IX on its head by requiring a clear statement from Congress that the safe harbor protects the Board. Because Congress enacted Title IX under its Spending Clause power, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, the Board’s violation must be unambiguous to trigger liability. Although the Spending Clause allows Congress to “attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds,” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987), “[t]he legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power … rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’” ''Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman'', 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). In other words, “if Congress intends to impose