Page:Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida (2020).pdf/42

 Supp. 3d at 1325. If we thought it necessary, we would affirm this holding. But counsels otherwise. Our dissenting colleague accuses us of shirking our duty because we do not delve into the meaning of “sex” in Title IX. To the contrary, we follow the lead of the Supreme Court in, which found it unnecessary to perform that analysis as to Title VII. We need not interpret the term “sex” to recognize that Mr. Adams suffered discrimination at school because he was transgender. , 140 S. Ct. at 1746. And nothing in or the language of § 106.33 justifies the School Board’s discrimination against Mr. Adams. Specifically, § 106.33 does not dictate how schools should approach transgender students’ restroom use or define a transgender student’s “sex.” Indeed, no court of appeals has accepted the School Board’s arguments that § 106.33 requires transgender students to use the restroom of their sex assigned at birth. , 949 F.3d at 1227 (rejecting a strict “biological sex” reading of § 106.33 as it applies to transgender students);, 858 F.3d at 1047 (observing that the term “biological” does not appear in Title IX);