Page:Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida (2020).pdf/41

 S. Ct. at 1746. Title IX and its regulations do not declare which sex should determine a transgender student’s restroom use. Thus, the language of § 106.33 does not insulate the School Board from Mr. Adams’s discrimination claim based on his transgender status.

The School Board argues that endorses its reading of the term “sex” as strictly “biological sex.” According to the Board, Bostock laid out “a conception of sex founded in biology and not gender identity.” Appellant’s Suppl. Br. at 4.

lends no support to the Board’s interpretation of “sex.” The Court expressly declined to decide whether Title VII’s reference to “sex” means only “reproductive biology” or incorporates “some norms concerning gender identity.”  140 S. Ct. at 1739 (quotation marks omitted). The Court felt it unnecessary to answer this open interpretive question in order to hold discrimination against transgender people unlawful. Thus, its analysis proceeded “on the assumption that ‘sex’ signified what the employers suggest, referring only to biological distinctions between male and female.”

The District Court in this case studied the statute and the case law and held that “the meaning of ‘sex’ in Title IX includes ‘gender identity.’”, 318 F.