Page:Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida (2020).pdf/34

 did in covered workplaces. And, as we have explained, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of discrimination based on sex applies in both settings.

With ’s guidance, we conclude that Title IX, like Title VII, prohibits discrimination against a person because he is transgender, because this constitutes discrimination based on sex.

Of course, Mr. Adams still bears the burden of showing that the School District discriminated against him by barring him from the boys’ restroom because he is transgender. With the benefit of the District Court’s careful factfinding, we are satisfied that Mr. Adams succeeds on his claim of sex discrimination under Title IX, and we affirm the District Court’s judgment in his favor.

Again, Title IX provides that no person shall, “on the basis of sex … be subjected to discrimination” at school. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Discrimination “refers to distinctions or differences in treatment that injure protected individuals.”, 548 U.S. 53, 59, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2410 (2006); , 544 U.S. 167, 174, 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1504 (2005) (describing sex discrimination under Title IX as “differential” and “less favorable” treatment (quotation marks omitted)). Title IX’s implementing regulations explain that a school cannot “[s]ubject any person to separate or different rules of behavior, sanctions, or other treatment” on the basis