Page:Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida (2020).pdf/32

 nothing in Title IX’s regulations or any administrative guidance on Title IX excuses the School Board’s discriminatory policy.

Our analysis of Mr. Adams’s Title IX claim benefits from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in, 590 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). announced that Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination also forbids discrimination based on transgender status. at 1737. The Court instructed that “it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being … transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex.” at 1741.

has great import for Mr. Adams’s Title IX claim. Although Title VII and Title IX are separate substantive provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, both titles prohibit discrimination against individuals on the basis of sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (Title VII); 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Title IX). Both titles also employ a “but-for causation standard,” which found critical to its expansive interpretation of sex discrimination. , 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (citing, 570 U.S. 338, 350, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2527 (2013)); , 589 U.S. ___, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1014 (2020) (explaining that but-for causation is the “default” rule for federal antidiscrimination laws). Given these similarities, it