Page:Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida (2020).pdf/25

 The School Board’s bathroom policy also treats transgender students like Mr. Adams differently because they fail to conform to gender stereotypes. To survive heightened scrutiny, a sex classification “must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.”, 518 U.S. at 533, 116 S. Ct. at 2275. And “sex-based stereotypes are also insufficient to sustain a classification.”, 858 F.3d at 1051; , 511 U.S. 127, 138–40, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1426–27 (1994) (holding the Equal Protection Clause prohibits peremptory challenges to jurors based on gender stereotypes); , 663 F.3d at 1320 & n.9 (“[G]overnmental reliance on gender-based stereotypes is dispositive in … equal protection analysis … .”).

Gender stereotypes “presume that men and women’s appearance and behavior will be determined by their sex.”, 663 F.3d at 1320. Mr. Adams is considered transgender “precisely because of the perception that his … behavior transgresses gender stereotypes.”  at 1316. Because Mr. Adams was assigned a female sex at birth but identifies consistently and persistently as a boy and presents as masculine, he defies the stereotype that one’s gender identity and expression should align with one’s birth sex. (noting that transgender persons’ “appearance, behavior, or other personal characteristics differ from