Page:Adams ex rel. Kasper v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida (2020).pdf/18

 this way, the bathroom policy does not even apply to all transgender students equally.

Thus, the School District’s criteria for determining a student’s bathroom use do not achieve the School Board’s stated goal of restricting transgender students to the restroom of their assigned sex at birth. The designation of a student’s sex on his school enrollment documents is not a “legitimate, accurate proxy” for his sex assigned at birth. , 429 U.S. at 204, 97 S. Ct. at 460. It is arbitrary that some transgender students—like Mr. Adams—are restricted by the bathroom policy, while others are beyond its reach. Again, the Fourteenth Amendment requires a substantial, accurate relationship between a gender-based policy and its stated purpose. , 473 U.S. at 441, 105 S. Ct. at 3255;, 429 U.S. at 198, 97 S. Ct. at 457. Because the bathroom policy does not do what it was designed to do, the School Board cannot show the requisite substantial relationship. , 411 U.S. 677, 690–91, 93 S. Ct. 1764, 1772 (1973) (plurality opinion) (rejecting a gender-based policy as arbitrary because the government did not show that the policy promoted “administrative convenience” by actually saving any money or time (quotation marks omitted)).

And there are broader constitutional concerns. The School Board’s concerns about transgender students endangering restroom privacy are not borne out by the