Page:Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer.pdf/8

8 The District Court concluded that Laufer lacked standing and dismissed her complaint. The First Circuit reversed, relying primarily on this Court’s holding in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 363 (1982), that a tester had standing to sue under the Fair Housing Act. When Acheson Hotels petitioned for certiorari, Laufer agreed. She highlighted that the Circuits were split as to her standing and argued that “clarity from this Court is badly needed.” Brief in Opposition 1. After we granted certiorari and set the case for argument, Laufer filed a notice in the District Court of her voluntary dismissal of her claim with prejudice. And, even though Acheson Hotels (and several amici) had already filed briefs, Laufer requested that we dismiss this case as moot. We denied her request at that time, but agreed to consider it at oral argument. The case has been fully briefed and the Court has heard argument on the merits. Today, however, the majority opts to resolve this case on mootness. We can—and should—address the question on which we granted certiorari.

I would not dismiss this case as moot. There is no question that we have authority to address Laufer’s standing. Standing and mootness are both jurisdictional doctrines that flow from Article III. And, there is no mandatory “sequencing of jurisdictional issues.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 584 (1999). Indeed, as the majority and Laufer herself acknowledge, we have the discretion to determine either “ ‘threshold groun[d] for denying audience to a case on the merits.’ ” Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U. S. 422, 431 (2007) (quoting Ruhrgas, 526 U. S., at 585); ; Suggestion of Mootness 9 (“[T]his Court has discretion to resolve either issue first”).

We should address Laufer’s standing, rather than resolve this case on mootness. As an analytical matter, whether Laufer had standing the day she filed her suit is logically