Page:Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer.pdf/5

Rh Acheson, on the other hand, stresses that the difficult standing issue is the reason we took this case. Though Laufer’s case is dead, the circuit split is very much alive. This Court has received briefs and heard oral argument. For efficiency’s sake, Acheson insists that we should settle the issue now rather than repeating the work later. Moreover, Acheson warns that if we dismiss this case for mootness, the standing issue might not come back anytime soon. While Laufer has disavowed the intention to file any more ADA tester suits, Tr. of Oral Arg. 70, others will file in the circuits that sided with her, and hotels will settle, regarding it as pointless to challenge circuit precedent in this Court. Why would any hotel take a case this far, Acheson asks, if the respondent can evade our review by abandoning a claim rather than risking a loss?

We are sensitive to Acheson’s concern about litigants manipulating the jurisdiction of this Court. We are not convinced, however, that Laufer abandoned her case in an effort to evade our review. She voluntarily dismissed her pending ADA cases after a lower court sanctioned her lawyer. She represented to this Court that she will not file any others. Laufer’s case against Acheson is moot, and we dismiss it on that ground. We emphasize, however, that we might exercise our discretion differently in a future case.

The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36 (1950). objects to this disposition, urging us to instead leave the First Circuit’s judgment in place. (opinion concurring in judgment). Our Munsingwear practice is well settled. See, e. g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 584 U. S. 236, 240 (2018) (per curiam); Great Western Sugar Co. v.