Page:Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer.pdf/15

Rh becomes moot, “the existence of a case or controversy” is at an end, and there is therefore no basis for “the exercise of judicial power.” Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U. S. 301, 306, n. 3 (1964); see also Chapman v. Doe, 598 U. S. –––, ––– (2023) (, dissenting). Mootness thus justifies only dismissal. Barring some other justification, we can go no further.

Vacatur is a different animal entirely. Vacatur is a remedy that erases a judgment that has already been rendered. Here, the Court invokes a so-called Munsingwear vacatur, see, a species of vacatur that we have sometimes applied to judgments in civil cases that have “become moot while on [their] way here or pending our decision on the merits,” 340 U. S., at 39.

The precise origins of vacatur, both as a general matter and in its Munsingwear form, are uncertain. In fact, some have described the power of a court to vacate a judgment as “shrouded in ancient lore and mystery.” Advisory Committee’s Note on Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b), 28 U. S. C. App., p. 289. It seems plausible that our authority to vacate a lower court’s judgment under Munsingwear arises from our “supervisory appellate power” to “make such disposition of the case as justice requires.” Walling v. James V. Reuter, Inc., 321 U. S. 671, 676 (1944); see also U. S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U. S. 18, 21–22 (1994). All agree, however, that vacatur extends from the historical practice of equity, which for centuries has provided courts with the power “to protect all rights and do justice to all concerned.” Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 805, 807