Page:A series of intercepted letters in Mexico.djvu/45

 commander-in-chief, but Santa Anna should have united all his disposable force to assist Valencia, in order to destroy the common enemy. Various reflections occur upon the conduct of Santa Anna, who has given orders that Valencia shall be shot wherever he may be found. It is said that Valencia answered the order to retire or avoid a fight with the enemy—that he thought his position advantageous, and as a Mexican and as a soldier he could not obey the orders of a traitor and a coward, &c. &c. About noon, a division of the enemy approached, which it is supposed was under the order of Scott himself, to attack San Antonio. Santa Anna ordered the few pieces of heavy ordnance he had there to be spiked, and retired with the light pieces to Churubusco, where a bloody engagement took place, and it is said that the Americans lost a great many men. Santa Anna directed the defence of that point with the brigade of Perez, (the 1st, 3d, and 4th light infantry, and the 11th of the line,) the Batt'n of National Guards, Independence and Bravo, the Piquet of St. Patrick, and various other corps. The Piquet of St. Patrick, it is said, was almost totally destroyed.

(This Piquet, so called, was composed of deserters from the American army, and about 80 of them were taken prisoners and are now under trial for their lives.)

It is not known where the Batt'ns of Independence and Bravo are. The light infantry and the 11th regiment kept up at the commencement a heavy fire, but on the approach of the enemy within pistol shot they fled. Nothing is known of Perez. At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon Santa Anna entered this place with a large body of cavalry and with nearly all the brigade of Perez, the Batt'ns of National Guards, Hidalgo and Victoria, which never burnt a single cartridge—and various other corps. Santa Anna went to the Palace and the troops to their quarters. The result of the actions of this day has been the loss of 45 pieces of artillery—of the dead, wounded, prisoners and dispersed we have no certain information. An army of twenty thousand men and more than 50 pieces of artillery (I speak of those that were used) has been routed by another of nine or ten thousand, without artillery, and without knowing the ground, and while we had the advantage of selecting our positions. It is then clear that our army does not deserve the name of soldiers, and it were better that it did not exist. The incapacity of our generals is astonishing, but even more so their cowardice, and that of the greater part of the soldiers; although they are very brave in the commission of brutalities. It is said, among other things, that an unfortunate American officer on horseback