Page:A history of the military transactions of the British nation in Indostan.djvu/542

518 A thousand Europeans, including a company of 80 Coffrees, and six hundred Sepoys, were allotted to serve in the attack they were divided into three divisions; the first led by Major Monson, was to assault the south face of the south pettah, and having entered, were to advance through the streets to the esplanade, where the main body of the French troops were lying; who at the same time were to be attacked on the right by the second division, advancing out of the pettah to the west: this division was commanded by Major Robert Gordon. The third Major Brereton commanded himself, as the reserve for occasions, and they took post under a ridge which runs parallel to the west face of the south pettah, but farther back on the plain than the pettah allotted to Gordon's division. The European and black horse were to halt a mile in the rear of Brereton's. The rest of the troops were left to guard the camp. Monson's division consisted of 360 Europeans, of whom 200 were grenadiers, all that were in the army, and they had one company of Sepoys as attendants: Gordon's were 200 Europeans, and 80 Coffrees; Brereton's 360 Europeans and 500 Sepoys. Each of the three divisions had two excellent brass six-pounders.

The pettah to the South has three principal streets, which intersect it intirely from north to south, and several others in the same direction, of shorter extent; nor are any of the cross streets from east to west regularly pervious from one wall to the other, and some of them are only short communications between the streets in the other direction: so that many dodging advantages might be taken by knowledge of their different bearings and intersections. At two in the morning, the head of Monson's division approached towards the gateway on the south face of the pettah, and were challenged and declared by two or three Sepoys advanced on the plain to look out; on which the guards on the ramparts began to fire. The gateway was in a return of the rampart from the left, and the road to it lay under the rest of the rampart to the right, so that the two field-pieces which were advancing at the head of the line could not batter the gate at less than 150 yards, without being immediately under the fire of this part of the rampart, which