Page:A history of the military transactions of the British nation in Indostan, Volume 1.djvu/303

Book IV. 100 of the garrison, and all together forcing their way into the palace, they got the Nabob into his palankeen, and escorted him to the camp surrounded by 200 Europeans with fixed bayonets; the male-contents not daring to offer him any outrage as he was passing, nor on the other hand was any injury offered to them: for notwithstanding such proceedings in more civilized nations rarely happen, and are justly esteemed mutiny and treason; yet in Indostan they are common accidents, and arise from such causes as render it difficult to ascertain whether the prince or his army is most in fault. The Nabob had certainly no money to pay his troops; so far from it that the English had now for two years furnished all the expence of their own troops in the field: but it is a maxim with every prince in India, let his wealth be ever so great, to keep his army in long arrears, for fear they should desert. This apprehension is perhaps not unjustly entertained of hirelings collected from every part of a despotick empire, and insensible of notions of attachment to the prince or cause they serve; but from hence the soldiery, accustomed to excuses when dictated by no necessity, give no credit to those which are made to them, when there is a real impossibility of satisfying their demands; and a practice common to most of the princes of Indostan, concurs not a little to increase this mistrust in all who serve them: for on the one hand the vain notions in which they have been educated inspire them with such a love of outward shew, and the inervating climate in which they are born renders them so incapable of resisting the impulses of fancy; and on the other the frequent reverses of fortune in this empire dictate so strongly the necessity of hoarding resources against the hour of calamity, that nothing is more common than to see a Nabob purchasing a jewel or ornament of great price, at the very time that he is in the greatest distress for money to answer the necessities of the government. Hence, instead of being shocked at the clamours of their soldiery, they are accustomed to live in expectation of them, and it is a maxim in their conduct to hear them with patience, unless the croud proceed to violence; but in order to prevent this they take care to attach to their interests some principal officers, with such a number of the best troops as may serve on emergency to check the tumult, which is rarely headed by a man of distinction. But when