Page:A history of the military transactions of the British nation in Indostan, Volume 1.djvu/113

Book I. necessity to reduce the fort of Ariancopang, for a party of 200 men stationed near it would have always kept in awe the garrison, which consisted only of 100: now the reduction of this little fort, besides causing the loss of 150 men, together with two of the most experienced officers, and thereby discouraging the rest, stopt the progress of the whole army eighteen days. When arrived before the town, Mr. Boscawen, unexperienced in military operations by land, relied, in obedience to his instructions, on the opinion of the engineers, who made a great blunder in carrying on the attacks against that part of the town, to which an insuperable morass prevented them from approaching nearer than 800 yards: and even had there been no morass, the situation of the camp to the westward would have been injudiciously chosen, since it subjected the transporting of the cannon and heavy stores to a difficult passage of two or three miles, which employed the labour of numbers of sailors, and demanded frequent detachments of soldiers to escort and defend them from the sallies of the enemy; and the soldiers and sailors thus employed were taken off from the operations of the siege, which required nothing less than the service of every European in the camp. The north-side was the part against which the attack ought to have been directed: for the ground in front of this side was sound, and would have permitted the approaches to have been carried on to the foot of the glacis, without meeting with any natural impediments; and the camp extending behind the lines to the northward, would have effectually protected the cannon and stores, when landed, from the danger of sallies; and at the same time have saved the labour and inconveniencies of transporting them from a long distance; for they might have been landed at the camp itself. Very few examples of gallant service were exhibited during the siege. The engineers were utterly unqualified for the enterprise, but the artillery-men and officers knew their business, and always behaved with resolution; and Mr. Boscawen himself on all occasions exerted the same activity and courage which distinguished his character as a naval officer; but these qualities did not compensate his want of knowledge in the art of war on shore. This knowledge is not incompatible with skill in the marine service; and it is much to be lamented, that both together have not of late years been cultivated