Page:A history of the military transactions of the British nation in Indostan, Volume 1.djvu/105

Book I. upon by eight different batteries planted along the shore, as well as from the forts at the entrance of the harbour, where a large ship of two tiers lay at anchor, with her broadside across it; and that there were twelve other ships at anchor within the harbour, four of which were of force, and equipped for service. As soon as it was dark the barges of the six line of battle ships were sent to sound, and on their return reported that a reef of rocks ran all along about 20 yards from the shore, which rendered it impossible for boats to land, except at the entrance of the rivers over against which the fleet was at anchor, or at the harbour itself: here they had discovered, that the channel leading into it was not more than 100 fathom wide, and that this entrance would be subject to the greatest difficulties by the opposition of the south-east wind. Upon receiving this intelligence, the admiral called a council of war, composed of the principal land and sea officers, and it was resolved, that, as they were ignorant of the strength of the enemy, three armed boats should be sent to endeavour to land in the night, and take by surprize a man from the shore, from whom intelligence might probably be obtained: this was attempted, but in vain. The next morning, the 25th of June, the council of war assembled again, and were of opinion, that although their force was sufficient to reduce the island, yet the attack, and the maintenance of it when taken, would not only retard, but might probably disable the armament from undertaking the siege of Pondicherry, which Mr. Boscawen was instructed to consider as the principal object of his destination: it was therefore resolved to proceed to the coast of Coromandel without delay, that the squadron might arrive there in time to act before the change of the monsoon in October. The island would certainly have been reduced, if the conquest of it had been the principal object of the armament; for the whole of the French force consisted only of 500 regular troops, 200 European inhabitants disciplined as militia, 1.500 Caffre slaves on whose service and attachment the French had little reliance, and 1,000 sailors belonging to the ships. If the wind, as it generally does, blew always against the entrance of the northern harbour, it would indeed be impracticable to reduce it with ships working against a contrary wind in a narrow channel, and exposed without reliance to the