Page:A history and description of Roman political institutions (IA historyanddescri00abbo).pdf/63

Rh remember that the whole tendency of constitutional development at this time was to rob the patricians of exclusive political powers, but it is hard to see how the change made in 339 can have helped to accomplish this end. The principle which the Publilian law applied to legislation was extended by the passed probably in the year 287, to elections also. By th decadence of the influence of the, which followed this legislation, the last serious obstacle was removed from the path of the as an elective and a legislative body. The clauses of the have been discussed. The third clause, according to Livy's narrative, enacted This part of the Publilian law, at least in the form in which it has come down to us, seems to be identical in force, not only with the  of 287, which, according to the elder Pliny, provided  What relation do these three laws bear to one another? It is almost impossible to say. We can assume that the law of 449 made enactments of the plebeian assembly unconditionally binding on the whole people, and that the measures of 339 and 287 reaffirmed the principle already established, and sought to strengthen it at weak points; but on the one hand it is incredible that the plebeian assembly was made a supreme legislative body as early as 449, and on the other hand it would be highly improbable to suppose that the plebeians would have needed almost one hundred and seventy-five years to secure the recognition of the principle already formulated into law. Of one fact we are sure, viz., that after 287 were unconditionally binding on the whole community. We seem forced to assume, therefore, that under the Valerio-Horatian law enactments of the