Page:A critical and exegetical commentary on Genesis (1910).djvu/96

 he accepts the main outline of the history as fixed in tradition. But whether he knew that tradition from other sources than J and E, is a question not so easily answered. For the primitive period, direct dependence on J is improbable, because of the marked diversity in the accounts of the Creation and the Flood: here P seems to have followed a tradition closely akin to, but not identical with, that of J. In the history of the patriarchs there seems no reason to suppose that he had any other authorities than J and E. The general course of events is the same, and differences of detail are all explicable from the known tendencies of the Code. But the important facts are that nearly the whole of the history, both primitive and patriarchal, is reduced to a meagre summary, with little save a chronological significance, and that the points where the narrative becomes diffuse and circumstantial are (with one exception) precisely those which introduce a new religious dispensation: viz. the Creation, the Flood, the Abrahamic covenant, and the Exodus. The single exception is the purchase of Machpelah (ch. 23), an event which doubtless owes its prominence to its connexion with the promise of the land to Abraham and his seed. For the rest, a certain emphasis naturally lies on outstanding events, like the origin of the name Israel (35$9f.$), or the settlement of Jacob's family in Egypt (47$5-11$); and the author lingers with interest on the transmission of the patriarchal blessing and promise from Isaac to Jacob (28$3$. 35$12$), and from Jacob to his sons (48$3f.$). But these are practically all the incidents to which P$g$ attaches any sort of significance of their own; and even these derive much of their importance from their relation to the chronological scheme into which they are fitted.—Hence to say that P's epitome would be 'unintelligible' apart from JE, is to confuse his point of view with our own. It is perfectly true that from P alone we should know very little of the characters of the patriarchs, of the motives which governed their actions, or of the connexion between one event and another. But these are matters which P had no interest in making 'intelligible.' He is concerned solely with events, not with causes or motives. The individual is sufficiently described when we are told whose son he was, how long he lived, what children he begot, and such like. He is but a link in the generations that fill up the history; and even where he is the recipient of a divine revelation, his selection for that privilege depends on his place in the divine scheme of chronology, rather than on any personal endowment or providential training.

The style of P$g$ can be characterised without the reserves and qualifications which were necessary in speaking of the difference between J and E (p. xlvii f.); there is no better illustration of the dictum le style c'est l'homme than in this remarkable document. Speaking broadly, the style reflects the qualities of the legal mind, in its stereotyped terminology, its aim at precise and exhaustive statement, its monotonous repetitions, and its general determination to