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116 published very nearly at the same period with the Essay of Hume, struck a more decided blow at all supernatural agency beyond what was justified by the sacred Scriptures, and approached by his arguments a dangerous neighbourhood to an interference with w r hat he did not avowedly attack. Hume considered the subject as a general point in the human understanding to which he admitted no exceptions. The argument of'this remarkable essay is too well known to require an explanation; but the impartiality too often infringed when the works of this philosopher are the subject of consideration, requires that it should be kept in mind, that he treats the proof of miracles, as he does that of the existence of matter, in a manner purely sceptical, with this practical distinction,—that supposing a person is convinced of, or chooses to say he believes in the abstract existence of matter, independent of the mere impressions conveyed by the senses, there is still room to doubt that miracles have been worked. It would have been entirely at variance with the principles of scepticism to have maintained that miracles were not, and could not have been performed, according to the laws of nature; but the argument of Mr Hume certainly leans to the practical conclusion, that our uncertainty as to what we are said to have experienced, expands into a greater uncertainty of the existence of miracles, which are contrary to the course of our experience; because belief in evidence is founded entirely on our belief in experience, and on the circumstance, that what we hear from the testimony of others coincides with the current of that experience; and whenever testimony is contradictory to the current of our experience, the latter is the more probable, and should we be inclined to believe in it, we must at least doubt the former. Thus the author concludes "That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish: and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force which remains after deducting the inferior." The application of his argument to the doctrines of Christianity he conceives to be, that "it may serve to confound those dangerous friends, or disguised enemies to the Christian religion, who have undertaken to defend it by the principles of human reason; our most holy religion is founded on faith, not on reason; and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is by no means fitted to endure." Hume is repeatedly at pains to protest against his being supposed to be arguing in the essay against the Chris- tian faith. These protests, however, as his biographer, Mr Burton, is constrained to admit, were uttered briefly and coldly, and in such a manner as made people feel, that if Hume believed in the doctrines of the Bible, he certainly had not his heart in them. A want of proper deference for religious feeling (adds this writer) is a defect that runs through all his works. There is no ribaldry, but at the same time there are no expressions of decent reverence. It is to be observed, also, that the argument of Hume against miracles is still a favourite weapon of the enemies of revealed religion. At the same time, it must be admitted that under proper regulation, the argument is of use in defining the boundaries of inductive reasoning, and in this way has proved undoubtedly serviceable to the progress of science.

The work by Dr Campbell in confutation of this essay, at first produced in the form of a sermon, and afterwards expanded into a treatise, which was published in 1762, is well known and appreciated. This admirable and conclusive production, while yet in manuscript, was shown to Hume by Dr Blair. Hume was much pleased with the candour of the transaction; he remarked a few passages hardly in accordance with the calm feelings of the other