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 that there was no evidence of bias or improper considerations in the decision not to seek the personal devices from former Secretary Clinton’s senior aides, the lack of urgency in seeking a search warrant for the Weiner laptop, and the prioritization of the Russia influence investigation.

As previously described, in an effort to learn from its past decisions, good and bad, the FBI is establishing a working group to provide recommendations for the staffing, structuring, and supervision of sensitive investigations to help avoid or mitigate similar missteps in the future.

7. Insubordination by former Director Comey

The OIG found that former Director Comey was insubordinate when he intentionally concealed from DOJ his intentions regarding the July 5, 2016, announcement and instructed his subordinates to do the same. The FBI does not condone insubordination at any level and will institute training to ensure compliance with policy and the chain of command, as appropriate.

8. The potentially improper use of FBI systems and devices to exchange messages, the related referrals for investigation, and the recommendations to create additional warning banners and guidance.

The OIG found that several FBI employees had exchanged text messages, instant messages, or both that included political statements. The OIG also found that some messages appeared to mix political opinion with discussions about the MYE investigation. The OIG concluded there is no evidence to connect the political views expressed by these employees with the specific MYE investigative decisions. Regarding the messages, the FBI will handle the OIG’s referrals pursuant to its disciplinary investigation and adjudication processes and will impose disciplinary measures as warranted.

Based on its review of these messages, the OIG separately recommended that the FBI add privacy warning banners to FBI-issued mobile devices and consider assessing whether employees are properly trained on the use of text messages and instant messages and whether it should provide additional guidance about the use of FBI devices for non-governmental purposes. FBI employees sign a Rules of Behavior Agreement expressly consenting to the monitoring of data communications over FBI information systems (emails, facsimile, computer database use and data storage, digital transmission of data, but not voice communications). This agreement form must be signed before access to any FBI Information Technology or Information Systems is granted. Existing policy also advises employees that “FBI personnel using FBI information systems have no reasonable expectation of privacy.” Further, the warning banners that appear at login on the FBI’s computer systems expressly apply to “all devices [or] storage media attached to this network or to a computer on this network.” Although the FBI has clear and unambiguous warnings related to the use of FBI Information Technology and Systems, including FBI-issued devices, the Executive Assistant Director of the Information and Technology Branch has been directed to implement the suggested warnings in the most technologically expeditious and feasible manner. The Bureau will also provide enhanced training on the governing policies related to device use, including but not limited to the use of FBI Information Technology and Systems for political conversations.