Page:A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (Foote).djvu/75

 them, but shall offer the authority of such men who profess to maintain Liberty. There are indeed very few real adversaries to the opinion I defend among those who pretend to be so; and upon due inquiry it will be found that most of those who assert Liberty in words, deny the thing when the question is rightly stated. For proof whereof let any man examine the clearest and acutest authors who have written for Liberty, or discourse with those who think Liberty a matter of experience, and he will see that they allow that the will follows the judgment of the understanding, and that when two objects are presented to man’s choice, one whereof appears better than the other, he cannot choose the worst—that is, cannot choose evil as evil. And since they acknowledge these things to be true they yield up the question of Liberty to their adversaries, who only contend that the will or choice is always determined by what seems best. I will give my reader one example thereof in the most acute and ingenious Dr. Clarke, whose authority is equal to that of many others put together, and makes it needless to cite others after him. He asserts that the will is determined by moral motives, and calls the Necessity by which a man chooses in virtue of those motives, moral Necessity. And he explains himself with his usual candor and perspicuity by the following instance. “A man,” says he, “entirely free from all pain of body and disorder of mind, judges it unreasonable for him to hurt or destroy himself; and being under no temptation or external violence he cannot possibly act contrary to this judgment, not because he wants a natural or physical power so to do, but because it is absurd and mischievous, and morally impossible for him to choose to do it. Which also is the very same reason why the most perfect rational creatures, superior to men, cannot do evil; not because they want a natural