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 such things. And if the divine prescience supposes the certain existence of all things future, it supposes also the necessary existence of all things future, because God can foreknow their certain existence only, either as that existence is the effect of his decree or as it depends on its own causes. If he foreknows that existence as it is the effect of his decree, his decree makes that existence necessary, for it implies a contradiction for an all-powerful being to decree anything which shall not necessarily come to pass. If he foreknows that existence as it depends on its own causes, that existence is no less necessary, for it no less implies a contradiction that causes should not produce their effects (causes and effects having a necessary relation to and dependence on each other) than that an event should not come to pass which is decreed by God.

Cicero has some passages to the purpose of this argument. Says he, “Qui potest provideri quidquam futurum esse quod neque causam habet ullam, neque notam, cur futurum fit?—Quid est igitur, quod casu fieri aut forte fortuna, putemus?—Nihil est enim tam contrarium rationi & constantia quam fortuna; ut mihi ne in Deum cadere videatur, ut sciat, quid casu & fortuito futurum fit. Si enim scit, certe illud eveniet. Sin certe eveniet, nulla est fortuna. Est autem fortuna. Rerum igitur fortuitarum nulla est presentio.” Also that illustrious reformer, Luther, says in his treatise against free will : “Concessa Dei præscientia & omnipotentia, sequitur naturaliter irrefragabili consequentia, nos per nos ipsos non esse factos, nec vivere, nec agere quicquam, sed per illius omnipotentiam. Cum autem tales nos ille ante præscierit futuros, talesque nunc faciat, moveat, & gubernit; quid potest fingi quæso, quod in nobis liberum fit, aliter & aliter fieri, quam ille præscierit aut nunc agat? Pugnat itaque ex diametro præscientia & omnipotentia Dei cum nostro libero arbitrio. Aut enim Deus