Page:A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (Foote).djvu/62

 and willing, in relation to what is true and good; yet he is still less ignorant, and less unhappy, by being necessarily determined in judging by what seems reasonable, and in willing by what seems best, than if he was capable of judging contrary to his reason and willing against his senses. For, were it not so, what seems false would be as just a rule of truth as what seems true, and what seems evil as just a rule of good as what seems good. Which are absurdities too great for any to affirm; especially if we consider that there is a perfectly wise and good Being who has given men senses and reason to conduct them.

Lastly, it is a perfection to be necessarily determined in our choices, even in the most indifferent things; because if in such cases there was not a cause of choice, but a choice could be made without a cause, then all choices might be made without a cause, and we should not be necessarily determined by the greatest evidence to assent to truth, nor by the strongest inclination for happiness to choose pleasure and avoid pain; to all which it is a perfection to be necessarily determined. For if any action whatsoever can be done without a cause, then effects and causes have no necessary relation, and by consequence we should not be necessarily determined in any case at all.

 

IV. A fourth argument to prove man a necessary agent shall be taken from the consideration of the divine prescience. The divine prescience supposes that all things future will certainly exist in such time, such order, and with such circumstances, and not otherwise. For if any things future were contingent, or uncertain, or depended on the liberty of man—that is, might or might not happen—their certain existence could not be the object of the divine prescience, it being a contradiction to know that to be certain which is not certain, and God himself could only guess at the existence of 