Page:A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (Foote).djvu/54

 in our respective judgments, by probable and improbable, as well as by evident appearances, which I have just now proved; but even not to be necessarily determined by probable appearances would be a greater imperfection than not to be necessarily determined by evident appearances, because almost all our actions are founded on the probable appearances of things, and few on the evident appearance of things. And therefore, if we could judge that what appears probable is not probable, but improbable or false, we should be without the best rule of action and assent we can have.

2. Were Liberty defined a power to overcome our reason by the force of choice, as a celebrated author may be supposed to mean when he says the will seems to have so great a power over the understanding being overruled by the election of the will, not only takes what is good to be evil, but is also compelled to admit what is false to be true; man would, with the exercise of such a power, be the most irrational and inconsistent being, and by consequence the most imperfect understanding being which can be conceived. For what can be more irrational and inconsistent than to be able to refuse our assent to what is evidently true to us, and to assent to what we see to be evidently false, and thereby inwardly give the lie to the understanding?

3. Were Liberty defined a power to will evil (knowing it to be evil) as well as good; that would be an imperfection in man, considered as a sensible being, if it be an imperfection in such a being to be miserable. For willing evil is choosing to be miserable, and bringing knowingly destruction on ourselves. Men are already sufficiently unhappy by their several volitions; founded on the wrong use of their faculties, and on the mistaken appearances of things. But what