Page:A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (Foote).djvu/46

 But let us put a case of true equality or indifference, and what I have asserted will more manifestly appear true. Let two eggs appear perfectly alike to a man; and let him have no will to eat or use eggs (for so the case ought to be put, to render things perfectly indifferent to him), because, if once a will to eat eggs be supposed, that will must necessarily introduce a train of causes which will ever destroy an equality of circumstances in relation to the things which are the objects of our choice. There will soon follow a second will to eat one first. And these two wills must put the man upon action, and the usages of the parts of his body to obtain his end; which parts are determined in their motions either by some habitual practice, or by some particular circumstance at that time, and cause the man to choose and take one of them first rather than the other. The case of equality being thus rightly stated, I say it is manifest no choice would or could be made; and the man is visibly prevented in the beginning from making a choice. For every man experiences that before he can make a choice among eggs, he must have a will to eat or use an egg; otherwise he must let them alone. And he also experiences, in relation to all things which are the objects of his choice, that he must have a precedent will to choose, otherwise he will make no choice. No man marries one woman preferably to another, or travels into France rather than into another country, or writes a book on one subject rather than another, but he must first have a precedent will to marry, travel and write.

It is therefore contrary to experience to suppose any choice can be made under an equality of circumstances. And by consequence it is matter of experience that man is ever determined in his willing or acts of volition and choice.

4. Fourthly, I shall now consider the actions of man consequent to willing and see whether he be free in