Page:A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (Foote).djvu/43

 is compelled to choose between two evils, you will never find a man who chooses the greatest, if it is in his power to choose the less; and that this is a truth manifest to all. And even the greatest modern advocates for Liberty allow that whatever the will chooseth, it chooseth under the notion of good; and that the object of the will is good in general, which is the end of all human actions.

This I take to be sufficient to show that man is not at liberty to will one or the other of two or more objects between which (all things considered) he perceives a difference; and to account truly for all the choices of that kind which can be assigned.

But, secondly, some of the patrons of Liberty contend that we are free in our choice among things indifferent, or alike, as in choosing one out of two or more eggs; and that in such cases the man, having no motives from the objects, is not necessitated to choose one rather than the other, because there is no perceivable difference between them, but chooses one by a mere act of willing without any cause but his own free act.

To which I answer, (1) first, by asking whether this and other instances like this are the only instances wherein man is free to will or choose among objects? If they are the only instances where man is free to will or choose among objects, then we are advanced a great way in the question; because there are few (if any) objects of the will that are perfectly alike; and because Necessity is hereby allowed to take place in