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 over-ruling our passions, appetites, sensations, and reason, chooses arbitrarily among objects; and renders the object chosen agreeable, only because it has chosen it) denies that we experience such, or any other Liberty; but contends that we rather experience a determination in all our actions. Says he, “We experience something in us which inclines us to a choice; and if it happens that we cannot give a reason of all our inclinations, a little attention will show us, that the constitution of our bodies, the bodies encompassing us, the present, or preceding state of our minds, and several little matters comprehended under these great causes, may contribute to make us choose certain objects, without having recourse to a pure indifference, or to I know not what power of the soul, which does upon objects what they say colors do upon the cameleon.” In fine he is so far from thinking that there is the least foundation, from experience, for the said notion of Liberty, that he treats it as a chimera, and compares it to the magical power of the fairies to transform things.

Lastly, the Journalists of Paris are very far from thinking Archbishop King’s notion of Liberty to be matter of experience, when they say that Dr. King not satisfied with any of the former notions of liberty, proposes a new notion; and carries indifference so far as to maintain that pleasure is not the motive, but the effect of the choice of the will; placet res quia eligitur, non eligitur quia placet. This opinion, add they, makes him frequently contradict himself.

So that upon the whole, the affair of experience, with relation to Liberty, stands thus. Some give the name Liberty to actions, which, when described, are plainly actions that are necessary. Others, though appealing to vulgar experience, yet inconsistently therewith, contradict the vulgar experience, by owning it to be an intricate matter, and treating it after an intricate